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bstract: Constitutions enshrine the fundamental values of 
a people and build a framework for a state’s public policy. 
With regard to intergenerational justice, their endurance 
gives rise to two concerns: the (forgone) welfare concern and the sov­
ereignty concern. In this paper, I outline a procedure for constitu­
tion­amending that is intergenerationally just. In its line of reason­
ing, the paper debates ideas such as perpetual constitutions, sunset 
constitutions, constitutional reform commissions and constitutional 
conventions both historically and analytically. It arrives at the con­
clusion that recurrent constitutional reform commissions in fixed time 
intervals strike the best balance between the necessary rigidity and the 
necessary flexibility of constitutions.
Introduction1
From the perspective of the reproduction of political orders, con-
stitutions are an interesting case. Arguably, they are the most im-
portant intergenerational contract in modern society. This raises 
the question of how binding this contract should be: flexible or 
fixed?
A “constitution” is usually2 defined as a system of fundamental 
principles according to which a state is to be governed. Consti-
tutions build a framework for a state’s public policy. They enjoy 
normative priority over ordinary statutes and regulate the manner 
in which ordinary laws are made. Constitutions also enshrine the 
fundamental values of a people, often in their preambles or in 
their first part. They can (but need not) contain a catalogue of 
basic human rights and liberties. Constitutions are distinguished 
from ordinary legislation by their rigidity. Written constitutions 
usually require legislative supermajorities, concurrent majorities 
of different houses of the legislature, and/or popular referenda 
in order to be changed.3 By their very nature, constitutions are 
intergenerational documents because they are intended to place 
certain questions beyond the reach of simple majorities. With few 
exceptions, they are meant to endure for many generations. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the inter-
generational challenge to “difficult to change” constitutions, start-
ing with employing a thought experiment. After clarifying my 
key concepts, and paying tribute to the beginning of the debate, I 
put forth my proposal for a procedure of constitution-amending 
that is intergenerationally just. I test this proposal against two 
main concerns: the (forgone) welfare concern and the sovereignty 
concern. The conclusion summarises why recurrent constitutional 
reform commissions in fixed time intervals strike the best balance 
between the necessary rigidity and the necessary flexibility of con-
stitutions, thereby fulfilling the requirements of intergenerational 
justice. Some questions regarding the possible design for these 
commissions are outlined for further research.
A thought experiment4
As a thought experiment, let us imagine that the founding fathers 
(no women are involved) of a newly­formed nation adopt a con­
stitution. In this constitution, the very last provision stipulates 
that no single clause of the constitution be changed or abolished 
for a time period of 300 years. After that time period, consti­
tutional changes are possible by a supermajority of 75% of the 
members of parliament.
This thought experiment is intended to illustrate the challenge 
that the idea of intergenerational justice poses to “very difficult to 
change” constitutions. In it, the framers of a constitution impose 
their will on subsequent generations. Those born in the next three 
centuries are expected to acquiesce to the norms of this constitu-
tion without their consent. But in a democracy, the legitimacy of 
governance is founded on the consent of the governed. All those 
who are subject to the rule of a constitution should be able to 
exert influence over the basic laws that regulate their lives.
“Sovereignty” means the ability of a people, of each generation5 of 
citizens, to live under rules of their own choosing. After all, whose 
is a constitution? If the answer is “the citizens of country X”, this 
means nothing else than it is the constitution of the citizens current­
ly alive. This is the appropriate state of affairs since dead people can 
neither be benefited by possessing something, nor harmed by losing 
a property, including the capacity to rule after their death. But if a 
constitution is too difficult to change, the dead citizens of country 
X wield power over the living,6 and the past rules over the present.
It might well not make a difference if those succeeding genera-
tions share the values and views of their ancestors, but what if they 
happen not to? What if succeeding generations see some provi-
sions of the constitution as a threat to their long-term well-being, 
or even as morally wrong? This problem is exacerbated when a sta-
ble majority of the citizenry would like to reform the constitution 
but falls short of the required supermajority of 66% or even 75%. 
Can we call it “the rule of the people” or “popular sovereignty” if 
stable majorities (let’s say from 50% + 1 vote up to a three-fifths 
supermajority) of the present demos cannot change certain consti-
tutional clauses for the simple reason that their forefathers put the 
bar for changing the constitution extremely high? “Generational 
sovereignty”7 is closely linked to the concept of “legitimacy” for 
two reasons, namely that 
a) “the people” is considered the only legitimate source of govern-
mental power in democracies;
b) as a matter of fact, “the people” does not consist of the same 
people over time as generations come and go when time passes.8
Terminology
In his otherwise well-formulated paper The Problem of a Perpetual 
Constitution, Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli writes: “A perpetual consti-
tution has no ‘sunset clause’, no date of expiration; it may [my 
emphasis] contemplate for its amendment and even specify a 
procedure for its modification, but it does not consider its own 
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abolition. When adopted, it is intended to govern a society for 
as long as that society exists, and to be accepted by the present 
and future members of that society as a valid charter of political 
association.”9 The problem with this definition is that the mod-
al verb “may” renders it inadequate. Its extension encompasses 
both constitutions that cannot be changed for an indefinite future 
(even longer than in the hypothetical construct at the beginning) 
and constitutions that can be amended by (super)majority vote at 
any time. Muñiz-Fraticelli’s terminology forces him to speak of 
“a constitution sufficiently perpetual”10 which is a contradiction 
in terms since “perpetuity” is not a gradual concept. It is more 
adequate, therefore, to distinguish terminologically:
a) Sunset constitution: A constitution that lapses automatically 
after a fixed time span, e.g. 19 years. (The analogue of this on the 
level of a single clause would be a “sunset clause”).
b) Perpetual constitution: A constitution that does not allow for 
amendment, repeal or replacement. (The analogue of this on the 
level of a single clause would be an “irrevocable clause”).
c) Endurance by default constitution: A constitution that endures 
by default in the sense that unless objection to it receives a certain 
level of political support, the constitution will endure. (The ana-
logue of this on the level of a single clause would be an “endurance 
by default clause”).
Muñiz-Fraticelli does not distinguish between b and c. In his ter-
minology, every constitution that is not a sunset constitution is by 
definition a perpetual constitution. But, as this paper will show, 
it is important to be able to distinguish terminologically a “per-
petual constitution” from an “endurance by default constitution” 
that is “difficult to change”. In comparison to ordinary laws, all 
constitutions are difficult to change, but this does not make them 
“perpetual” in the usual sense of the word (“eternal”, “everlast-
ing” or “perennial”). The constitution in the thought experiment 
could be called a temporarily unchangeable constitution. Despite 
its blatant rigidity, it is still less strict than a permanently un-
changeable (a “perpetual”) constitution. 
The beginning of the debate about perpetual constitutions
At the end of the 18th century, the incipient constitutionalism 
in the United States of America and France spurred an intensive 
and high-level debate. Perpetual constitutions and sunset consti-
tutions feature very prominently in the political theory literature 
due to the pro and con arguments of Jefferson’s famous propos-
al that a constitution should lapse automatically after 19 years 
in order to be intergenerationally legitimate. In a letter to James 
Madison from 6 September 1789,11 Thomas Jefferson pondered 
the problem of intergenerational domination. From a discussion 
of public debt, he switched to laws and constitutions: “On similar 
ground it may be proved that no society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always 
to the living generation. (...) The constitution and the laws of 
their predecessors extinguished them, in their natural course, with 
those whose will gave them being. (...) Every constitution, then, 
and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be en-
forced longer, it is an act of force and not of right.”12 Should laws 
remain valid until the succeeding generation repeals them? Jeffer-
son answered negatively and counselled an explicit opt-in deci-
sion: “It may be said that the succeeding generation exercising in 
fact the power of repeal, this leaves them as free as if the constitu-
tion or law had been expressly limited to 19 years only. In the first 
place, this objection admits the right, in proposing an equivalent. 
But the power of repeal is not an equivalent. It might be indeed 
if every form of government were so perfectly contrived that the 
will of the majority could always be obtained fairly and without 
impediment. But this is true of no form. The people cannot as-
semble themselves; their representation is unequal and vicious. 
Various checks are opposed to every legislative proposition. Fac-
tions get possession of the public councils. Bribery corrupts them. 
Personal interests lead them astray from the general interests of 
their constituents; and other impediments arise so as to prove to 
every practical man that a law of limited duration is much more 
manageable than one which needs a repeal.”13
In his reply, Madison dissented and pointed at the instability that 
would ensue. Madison’s reply is often unduly shortened in the 
contemporary discussion,14 but it is worthy to be cited at some 
length. First, he acknowledged: “The idea which the latter evolves 
is a great one; and suggests many interesting reflections to Leg-
islators; particularly when contracting and providing for public 
debts. (...) My first thoughts lead me to view the doctrine as not 
in all respects [Madison’s emphasis] compatible with the course of 
human affairs.” Madison’s objections were mainly of a practical 
nature.15 “Would not a Government ceasing of necessity at the 
end of a given term, unless prolonged by some Constitutional 
Act, previous to its expiration, be too subject to the casualty and 
consequences of an interregnum? (...) Would not such a periodi-
cal revision engender pernicious factions that might not otherwise 
come into existence; and agitate the public mind more frequently 
and more violently than might be expedient? (...) I can find no re-
lief from such embarrassments but in the received doctrine that a 
tacit assent may be given to established Governments & laws, and 
that this assent is to be inferred from the omission of an express 
revocation.”16 In the locus classicus, Madison already points at the 
necessary distinction between constitutions that are beneficial and 
those that are harmful to future generations: “[My observations] 
are not meant however to impeach either the utility of the prin-
ciple as applied to the cases you have particularly in view, or the 
general importance of it in the eye of the Philosophical Legislator. 
On the contrary it would give me singular pleasure to see it first 
announced to the world in a law of the U. States, and always kept 
in view as a salutary restraint on living generations from unjust & 
unnecessary [Madison’s emphasis] burdens on their successors.”17
The US Constitution that came into force in 1789/1791 did not 
become a sunset constitution; it became a constitution that is 
notoriously difficult to change. Today we live in a world with-
out sunset constitutions. In contrast to the situation in 1789, to 
defend the idea of a “constitution without a set expiration date” 
nowadays does not seem very challenging. It is a bit like beating 
a straw man.
As there is a need to strike a balance between the excesses of con-
stant change and inflexibility, both extremes, sunset constitutions 
and perpetual constitutions, can be regarded as indefensible.18 
Roznai concludes from a study of unamendable content in 734 
historic and current constitutions: “Treating the entire [my em-
As there is a need to strike a balance between the exces­
ses of constant change and inflexibility, both extremes, 
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phasis] constitution as unamendable derives either from ascrib-
ing it to a superhuman source, or from the constitution-maker 
being afflicted with exceptional arrogance and belief that he has 
achieved the apex of perfection.”19 The constitutions we find in all 
countries of the world are endurance by default constitutions, so 
this is the material to be dealt with, at least from the perspective of 
applied political philosophy. Figure 2 shows what types of endur-
ance by default constitutions can be distinguished.
Irrevocable provisions protected by eternity clauses
Isn’t there a type E-constitution? As mentioned, there is no such 
thing as a perpetual constitution anywhere in the world. Howev-
er, there are irrevocable provisions within endurance by default 
constitutions. I will call those provisions that are sheltered from 
alteration or repeal “irrevocable provisions”. I will call those provi-
sions that guarantee that some provisions are irrevocable “eternity 
clauses”.20 
Eternity clauses present the intergenerational challenge in its ex-
treme. They are the little brother of perpetual constitutions. In the 
735 past and present constitutions that Roznai examined, 28% 
include or included eternity clauses.21 If one believed that first 
and foremost basic rights and liberties (as far as they are part of 
constitutions) are candidates for irrevocable clauses, one is mis-
taken. In the constitutions that are or were in effect after World 
War II, less than 30% of the clauses referred to basic rights.22 
Around the globe, the form and system of government are more 
often the content of irrevocable clauses than anything else. While 
more than 100 constitutions protect the republican form of a gov-
ernment, some protect a monarchy.23 The second notable group 
is protecting the state’s political or governmental structure, such 
as federal or unitary, for instance, or presidential or parliamen-
tarian.24
To get a better understanding for eternity clauses and irrevocable 
content, here are a few examples from the US, Turkey, Germany 
and France. There are two provisions in the US Constitution that 
are irrevocable by the methods specified in Article 5. The first is 
that no amendment to the constitution may abolish the African 
slave trade prior to the year 1808,25 and the second is that “no 
state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage 
in the Senate.” The Turkish Constitution has a high number of 
irrevocable clauses: Article 1 declares the form of the state as a 
republic. Article 2 establishes the following: “The Republic of 
Turkey is a democratic, laic and social state governed by the rule 
of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national 
solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the na-
tionalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set 
forth in the Preamble.” Article 3 declares: “The Turkish state, with 
its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity.” It then decides 
upon the official language, the national flag, the national anthem 
and the national capital. Article 4, the eternity clause, declares the 
immovability of the founding principles of the Republic defined 
in the first three Articles and bans any proposals for their modifi-
cation. In the German “Basic Law”, the eternity clause in Article 
79 (3) shields the contents of article 1 and article 20 from being 
changed, as well as the division of the Federation into Länder and 
their participation in the legislative process.26 Article 20 enshrines 
some constitutional principles;27 article 1 protects human digni-
ty.28 In France, altering the “republican form of government” (ar-
ticle 89) is out of reach for the politicians. 
Most of the world’s eternity clauses are not irrevocable provi-
sions.29 In theory, this would allow a two-step process by which, 
firstly, the eternity clause could be abolished, and then, second-
ly, the previously entrenched content can be altered by normal 
constitutional change procedure. But some eternity clauses are 
declared irrevocable themselves30 – in this case of “second-order 
unamendability”, no legal recourse can be taken by successor 
generations to change the content that was entrenched by their 
predecessors.
“Institutions are sticky, and constitutions are the stickiest of 
them.”31 If this is true, eternity clauses are the stickiest of the 
stickiest of all institutions. Nevertheless, in the literature, the sig-
nificance of this stickiness is sometimes played down. It is some-
times light-heartedly asserted that succeeding generations are al-
ways free to abandon the constitutional order they inherited – by 
means of a revolution. From this, the conclusion is drawn that 
there is no intergenerational injustice in including irrevocable (or 
almost irrevocable) content in constitutions. But this is the most 
cynical argument of all, since it devalues human lives. Historical-
ly, revolutions were often followed by periods of unrest and civil 
war, and they usually brought about a plethora of casualties and 
a massive loss of well-being for a large share of the population. 
There should be easier ways for succeeding generations to get rid 
of an outdated constitutional legacy. 
The proposal: recurrent constitutional reform commissions
More often than not, the reason outdated provisions are not 
changed is not that the people still support them, but that re-
formers lack windows of opportunity to mobilise the silent (su-
per)majority.32 In type A and B constitutions, a time for reflection 
about the constitution is incorporated in the text of the constitu-
tion. In fixed intervals, a review has to be conducted either auto-
matically (type A), or the demos has to be asked if such a review 
should be taking place (type B). I will argue in the remainder 
of this article that constitutions that are automatically reviewed 
in fixed intervals (type A constitutions) rank first from the point 
of view of intergenerational justice. Type B constitutions come 
second as they also create a review situation (of a second order), 
even though such a review of the constitution is not mandato-
ry. In type C and D constitutions, inertia plays into the hands 
Constitutional amendment procedures should be 
 designed with the aim of making the voices of succeed­
ing generations heard from time to time by opening  
a window of opportunity.
Figure 1: Different forms of endurance by default constitutions
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of the existing system despite the fact that time goes on and the 
world changes constantly. Constitutional amendment procedures 
should be designed with the aim of making the voices of succeed-
ing generations heard from time to time by opening a window of 
opportunity.
A constitution should prescribe a time for its own revision. But, 
of course, the revision of constitutional provisions remains possi-
ble in the midst of such an interval (i.e. “spontaneously”) by the 
established amendment procedure as well.33 
Assuming the demographic data are available, one can calcu-
late the point in time at which the post-framers’ generation has 
become as numerous as the framers’ generation (“generational 
change point”) for each country and each base year. Based on the 
variables “number of eligible citizens in a base year x (framers’ 
generation)”, “citizens reaching the voting age in the years x+1, 
x+2, ..., x+n”, “deaths of framers’ generation members in the years 
x+1, x+2, ..., x+n”, one arrives at different time periods until the 
next generational change point for each country, depending on its 
population structure. An entire article could be devoted to such a 
model.34 To cut a long story short, I take 25 years as a good length 
of time between two constitutional reform commissions.
A constitutional reform commission at fixed time intervals strikes 
the right balance between the two legitimate goals of flexibility 
and rigidity. A constitutional reform commission at fixed time 
intervals strikes the right balance between the two legitimate goals 
of flexibility and rigidity. To be very clear: a constitutional reform 
commission is not a constitutional convention. The mandate of 
the latter would be to draft a new constitution of a piece, a mono-
lithic and integral new document. By contrast, the mandate of a 
reform commission is to make proposals for the adoption/change/
abolition of single clauses of endurance by default constitutions. 
There is no danger that a generation could end up without any 
constitution at all when a reform commission is at work. My pro-
posal substantiates Condorcet’s ideas, not Jefferson’s. While Jeffer-
son counselled that constitutions should be adopted anew by each 
generation, Condorcet argued that each generation should have a 
window of opportunity for a revision.35 
It is very likely that the implication of such a window of opportu-
nity is not that the constitution be rewritten from scratch, quite 
the contrary. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton 
have analysed each and every constitution written since 1789.36 
One of their key findings is that flexibility (defined as the con-
stitution’s ability to adjust to changing circumstances captured in 
the empirical analysis by the ease of formal and informal amend-
ment, either informally via constitutional construction by the 
courts or via formal amendment procedures by the legislature) is 
positively correlated with the endurance of a constitution.37 Like-
wise, the inclusiveness of a constitution (defined as the degree to 
which the constitution includes relevant social and political actors 
taking into account that time will change which societal groups 
will have a stake in the endurance of the constitution) is positively 
correlated with its stability over time. The life expectancy of the 
least inclusive constitution is a full 55 years less than the most 
inclusive constitution (14 years vs. 69 years). 
The finding that flexibility increases endurance makes sense in-
tuitively. Here is a second, slightly changed version of the initial 
thought experiment to illustrate this point:
In another state, the framers of a newly­formed constitution 
(women are involved now) install a review provision which stipu­
lates that, instead of leaving all constitutional clauses unchanged 
for 300 years, each generation can have a reform commission and 
revise the constitution.
Which constitution is more threatened to be repealed entirely 
 after 300 years: the one with the 300 year-old content due to the 
entrenched embargo by the framers’ generation, or the one that 
has been updated by each generation (who wanted to do this) in 
the last 300 years? In the first scenario, the citizens have been hin-
dered to exercise the pouvoir constituant for a long time, whereas 
in the second scenario no generation was shut out of their project 
of constitutionalism. Even if not all installed review commissions 
actually did lead to amendments, all generations have had their 
say. In this second version of the thought experiment, 300 years 
after the initial formulation of the constitution a revolution will 
be unnecessary, given that an evolutionary process (in the form of 
amendments) has taken place.
In what follows, I will try to defend my proposal in the light of 
two concerns: the (forgone) welfare concern and the sovereignty 
concern. 
The (forgone) welfare concern
The proclaimed benefits of constitutions for future generations – and 
the danger of parochialism
Since Madison, the benefits of constitutions for succeeding gen-
erations have often been highlighted. There are indeed good ar-
guments to aver a positive impact of constitutions on the quality 
of life of succeeding generations, compared to a world without 
constitutions. But constitutions are so commonplace in our real 
world nowadays that the danger of a people of being “constitu-
tionless” for a relevant time period is virtually non-existent. No 
doubt: constitutions are great inventions in the history of hu-
mankind. But this in itself does not defend “difficult to change” 
or even perpetual constitutions. Are they defendable at all? Here 
are some arguments that have been brought forward on their 
 behalf:
1) Constitutions as defenders of human rights and liberties: When 
constitutions entrench democratic rules and fundamental rights 
against their abolition, they make it more likely for succeeding gener­
ations to live under those rules and to enjoy these rights and liberties. 
Constitutions are thus devices to ensure intergenerational justice.38
It is certainly true that fundamental rights and liberties are a boon 
for present and future individuals. Fundamental rights are not 
only enshrined in international documents such as the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights or the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms but, 
selectively, also in national constitutions.39 One of these funda-
mental rights in a number of national constitutions is the right 
to freely exercise one’s religion. Religious freedom implies that 
there is no state religion, since a religion imposed by a govern-
ment would discriminate against both citizens of a different faith 
and citizens who are agnostics or atheists. Now, according to the 
devotees of very rigid constitutions the fact that religious free-
dom is enshrined in constitutions seems to support the conjecture 
that national constitutions are defenders of human rights. But the 
debate is usually led with a parochial bias: the constitutions of 
some Western states feature very prominently in it, but then the 
derived conclusion (namely, that only cumbersome procedures of 
constitution-amending are intergenerationally just) are more or 
Intergenerational Justice Review
1/2017
8
less generalised to all constitutions of the world. Based on some 
single-case studies of Western constitutions, general conclusions 
about the merits of rigid constitutions are drawn. It should not 
go unnoticed that only 4% of national states today lack a con-
stitution.40 But of all states, only 11.4% (home to 4.5% of the 
world population) can be classified as “full democracies”.41 Taking 
a global view, one cannot ignore the fact that almost all authori-
tarian states are constitutionalised states. It is thus quite surprising 
that only recently some political and legal theorists have discov-
ered the rest of the world.
It is high time for the mainstream to debate the intergeneration-
al challenge to constitutionalism in the context of authoritari-
an constitutions, too. Until now, only a few studies argue that 
constitutions in authoritarian regimes matter, and that they even 
have a causal effect in regime endurance.42 Several constitutions in 
Islamic countries enshrine the primacy of Islam.43 By fusing reli-
gion into the branches of government, these constitutional clauses 
defy the principle of religious freedom and are thus in contrast to 
one basic human right. Yet these examples are constantly ignored 
when legal scholars assert that constitutions are defenders of hu-
man rights and liberties.
The case of Iran deserves a closer look. Starting in 2009, Iran was 
repeatedly the site of vigorous youth revolts. Millions of young 
people took to the streets when waging the so-called Green Rev-
olution against the rigged election of Ahmadinejad and soon 
against the whole illiberal theocratic political system that is pro-
tected by the present constitution. They sought basic liberties. 
When “their” constitution was enacted 38 years ago (in 1979), 
the majority of the people living in this country today were not 
even born. The subsequent youth revolutions were repressed with 
sheer brutality, and failed to change the political system. The irre-
vocableness of some key provisions44 makes it very difficult for the 
succeeding generations in Iran to adapt their constitution to their 
values as the framers have sought to leave an immovable imprint. 
Now the youth has the choice between the devil and the deep blue 
sea. A revolution would give them the opportunity to replace the 
Iranian constitution, but during a revolution many (more) Irani-
ans would be imprisoned,  tortured and killed. 
As in Iran, constitutions in many countries of the world protect 
the political order without protecting human rights and liberties. 
The claim that future generations are the beneficiaries, not the 
victims, of constitutions enacted by their predecessors is wrong 
when looking at constitutions in authoritarian regimes. There is a 
paradox here: those states that would need the valve of mandatory 
constitutional reform commissions the most are also those least 
inclined to put it in their constitutions. 
Harm and forgone welfare are two distinct concepts. While some 
provisions of the Iranian constitution are harmful, other consti-
tutions, even in Western Europe and North America, can be held 
responsible for forgone welfare. Who would aver that all con-
stitutional clauses in established Western democracies foster the 
welfare of the citizens living under the jurisdiction of these con-
stitutions? Take the US constitution. The Second Amendment45 
to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms and was adopted on 15 December 1791, as 
part of the first ten amendments contained in the Bill of Rights. 
People who are forced to live under the Second Amendment forgo 
welfare. Comparative studies have shown that the percentage of 
people killed in gun incidents is much higher in the USA than in 
similar countries where citizens do not have a constitutional right 
to bear arms, such as Canada. If the Second Amendment were 
abolished, the welfare of all succeeding generations of US citizens 
would be higher. 
The example of this amendment is suggestive in even more respects. 
If the hunch is correct that the provisions of the Second Amend-
ment ought not to have been protected in the Bill of Rights, then 
we must ask what the fact of its protection says in general about 
the decisions of framers of the US Constitution. Two possibilities 
stand out as the most obvious. The first is that it speaks to the falli-
bility of the authors of constitutions. The second is that the mean-
ing and impact of the Second Amendment changed over time with 
population growth and with changing technology (a muzzle-load-
ed musket is not the same as an AK-47 assault rifle, after all).46 
Either explanation is the basis of a powerful argument for a regular 
review of constitutions at fixed time intervals.47 
To sum up: it is not overstated to say that the majority of pres-
ent people worldwide forgo welfare due to certain constitutional 
clauses in their respective constitutions.48 
2) It is a good thing that constitutions shield certain matters from 
capricious everyday politics. Contentious issues must be silenced at 
some point in order to secure peaceful co­operation and fellowship 
among all citizens.49 
Usually, democratic societies don’t avoid debate and deliberation. 
To use constitutions as “gag devices” is a risky strategy since “what-
ever is silenced might explode in the future”.50 In such cases, Roz-
nai counsels rather “a temporal unamendability, which allows the 
removal of the contentious issue from the public agenda for a while 
without long-term restraints.”51 The fear of agitating public passions 
too strongly could indeed be justified if constitutional reform com-
missions were established at very short intervals (every five years or 
so). But the “risk” of stirring up political interest and engagement 
once within the course of a generational cycle – every 25 years or so 
– seems bearable. Moreover, as long as the debated question is not 
“this constitution, or an alternative” but just single provisions of the 
constitution in place, the conflict will be manageable.
Veneration for constitution-making events should not obscure the 
fact that each constitution is man-made. Drawing on the com-
mon division between polity, policy and politics, constitutions are 
usually regarded as part of polity. This view neglects that constitu-
tions (and all other institutions) are “clotted” politics. Before they 
came into existence, politicking happened. Although politicking 
is never very harmonious, it is necessary from time to time.
3) No long­term private investment of time and capital will occur if 
there is no reasonable certainty of reaping its reward. Constitutions may 
reduce uncertainty – assuring for instance, the performance of contracts 
If the hunch is correct that the provisions of the Second 
Amendment ought not to have been protected in the Bill 
of Rights, then we must ask what the fact of its protect­
ion says in general about the decisions of framers of the 
US Constitution.
It is high time for the mainstream to debate the  
inter generational challenge to constitutionalism in  
the context of authoritarian constitutions, too. 
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and securing the rights to property – or increase it. A system in which 
the constitution and the laws are self­expiring increases uncertainty 
about the future and undercuts most long­term private investments.52 
The endurance of a constitution must not be equated with the en-
durance of ordinary laws. Even though laws have a more modest 
claim than constitutions, their longevity (at least in some areas) is 
often greater. France, for instance, has seen no less than 15 con-
stitutions come and go, yet the French Code Civil of 1805 has 
endured unaltered “[w]hether the French government has been 
imperial, republican, or fascist.”53 The same is true, by analogy, of 
the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in Germany, which came into effect 
on 1 January 1900.54
4) The citizens of yesterday know best what is right, better than the 
citizens of today themselves. 
The core argument of paternalistic thinking – that the framers 
of a constitution are in a position to identify and represent the 
general interest – does not hold. Scepticism is justified on a num-
ber of grounds. Firstly, it is extremely unlikely that the interests 
and preferences of a group of adults55 can be better identified by 
a third-party than by the affected group itself. The paternalis-
tic conception that men understand women’s needs better than 
women themselves was successfully rejected by women during 
their long battle for the right to vote. By the same token, we reject 
the idea that the interests of Afro-Americans could have been ad-
equately represented by their white masters during the era of the 
Declaration of Independence, which was neither demanded by – 
nor beneficial for – the represented. That citizens themselves best 
understand their own interests is a generally accepted principle in 
contemporary political theory for sound reasons.
It is nothing less than hubris for a generation to pretend to be 
able to determine which institutions will be the most appropriate 
ones over several decades, even centuries. Let’s change the thought 
experiment in the introduction and replace 300 years by 3,000 
years. It is difficult to even conceive that a constitution written 
3,000 years ago would function at all, let alone do so perfectly. The 
conditions in which people live now, the size of the population, the 
types of problems we face and the values we consider important, 
are all, in fact, very different to those of civilisations that existed 
3,000 years ago. Now, this being said, 300 years are likewise a con-
siderable time span in a world that changes at a rapid pace. A fram-
ers’ generation should be modest enough to acknowledge that their 
decreed rules of government might display some deficiencies in the 
future. If one generation entrenches irrevocably rules and systems 
of government,56 they mistrust their successors. But why should a 
father mistrust his adult son? Why a mother her adult daughter? 
A framers’ generation should offer a constitutional content to its 
successors, not try to force it upon its children and grandchildren.
5) There is more rationality – that is, more checks and balances 
against short­term passions – in older constitutions.
Since Madison, the defenders of very rigid constitutions have 
been arguing that their content must be protected against changes 
by successor generations that are motived by irrationality and pre-
sentism. The resounding assertion that later generations will pan-
der to their “passions” and short-term interests can be countered 
by pointing at an interesting development in constitution-amend-
ing worldwide. The growing acceptance of our responsibility for 
posterity has resulted in the fact that constitutions, especially the 
ones which were adopted in the last few decades, refer verbatim 
to long-term thinking and speak of the obligations of today’s cit-
izenry towards future generations.57 These newly inserted clauses 
may be termed “posterity protection provisions” (PPPs).58 The-
matically, most of these clauses fall into one of the following three 
categories: general PPPs, ecological PPPs and financial PPPs.59 
An example for the ecological PPPs is Art. 24 of South Africa’s 
Constitution of 1994.60 Examples for financial PPPs are the “debt 
brakes” recently adopted by several European countries. The Con-
stitution of Poland, for instance, limits the level of national public 
debt to three-fifths of GDP.61
Some of the PPPs are enshrined as fundamental rights; some others 
are enshrined as statements of public policy, often in preambles, 
and hence function rather as a guide than a restriction for pub-
lic policy-making. Individual basic right PPPs aimed at environ-
mental protection can be found, inter alia, in the constitutions of 
Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal and South 
Africa. Often they do not explicitly mention future generations, 
but give every inhabitant of the country the right to a healthy and 
well-balanced environment. This follows the rationale that protect-
ing the environment for today’s generations is also good for future 
generations. Public policy PPPs are based on the assumption that 
there is a potential conflict of interests between present and future 
generations with regard to many environmental issues, for instance 
nuclear waste and global warming. Today’s generations can benefit 
by burdening future generations. These provisions usually men-
tion future generations explicitly and underline our responsibility 
to them. Article 20a in the German Grundgesetz is based on this 
approach (likewise, provisions in the constitutions  of the Czech 
Republic, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Spain, Swe-
den, and Switzerland).
Yet another distinction is their abstractness v. concreteness: while 
intergenerational provisions are often formulated in abstract terms, 
they sometimes adopt very specific formulations – e.g. when they 
set a specific debt ceiling or declare specific areas as national parks.62
The literature on PPPs, especially those that constitutionalise 
“green rights”, is abundant. The important point for our context 
is that most of these clauses have been adopted just recently. Cho 
and Pedersen mention a time span of 25 to 30 years,63 which is 
roughly equivalent to the time span in which the vulnerability of 
the environment came to the fore in public and scientific debate. 
This contradicts the hypothesis that there is more rationality and 
more foresight in older constitutions. It refutes the claim of the 
proponents of perpetual or “difficult to change” constitutions that 
the succeeding generations could give more room for passion than 
for wisdom in “their” rounds of constitutionalism. 
While there is no consensus as to whether or not mankind has 
progressed morally since ancient times, some theorists do see 
some kind of moral progress at work.64 One would expect this to 
materialise in constitutional evolvement, unless stunted by oner-
ous constitution-amending mechanisms. The insertion of PPPs 
in constitutions, however, can be regarded as a sign of moral pro-
gress, since these provisions are guided by an impartial concern 
for the common good in the long term.
That citizens themselves best understand their own in­
terests is a generally accepted principle in contemporary 
political theory for sound reasons.
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The sovereignty concern
Definitions of sovereignty
A definition of sovereignty has already been used in the introduc-
tion but will now be carved out more thoroughly. Axel Gosseries 
presents three concepts of generational sovereignty of which the 
first one, termed “jurisdictional generational sovereignty”, reads 
as follows: “A generation is jurisdictionally sovereign during its 
period of existence to the extent that it is free from enforceable 
extra-generational jurisdictional claims made by other generations 
willing to impose their own rules.”65 With regard to constitution-
alism, a shorter, yet sufficiently broad definition would be: “A 
generation within a state can be called sovereign if it has the abili-
ty to live under constitutional provisions of their own choosing.”66 
The sovereignty concern and the (forgone) quality concern are 
interconnected. Imagine the following cases:
1) A people lives under the jurisdiction of a “very difficult to 
change” constitution67 that was established long ago. All of the 
constitution’s provisions in fact foster their welfare/guarantee 
their liberties but the citizens are under the false impression that 
they do not. The citizens thus want to change/repeal/add one or 
several provisions. But the rigidity of the constitution does not 
allow for them to do so.
2) A people lives under the jurisdiction of a “very difficult to 
change” constitution that was established long ago. The citizens 
are under the impression that all of their constitution’s provisions 
foster their welfare and guarantee their liberties, which in fact 
they do. The citizens don’t want to change/repeal/add any sin-
gle provision. The rigidity of this constitution would not have 
allowed for them to do so anyway.
3) A people lives under the jurisdiction of a “very difficult to 
change” constitution that was established long ago. One or more 
of the constitution’s provisions do in fact impair their potential 
welfare/infringe on their liberties, and the citizens recognise this 
fact. The citizens thus want to change/repeal/add one or several 
provisions. But the rigidity of the constitution does not allow for 
them to do so.
4) A people lives under the jurisdiction of a “very difficult to 
change” constitution that was established long ago. One or more 
of the constitution’s provisions in fact impair their potential wel-
fare/infringe on their liberties but the citizens don’t recognise this 
fact. The citizens don’t want to change/repeal/add any single pro-
vision. The rigidity of this constitution would not have allowed 
for them to do so anyway.
The sovereignty concern applies to all four cases, but to a different 
extent. The least problematic is case 2. Is generational sovereignty 
impaired here at all? Take the individual counterpart to this ques-
tion: Is your freedom restrained if you are not free to do what you 
don’t want to do – and should not be doing anyway? One may 
conclude that there is at most a theoretical, if any, sovereignty 
concern here.
In case 3, there are good reasons to reform constitutional provi-
sions since they clearly impair welfare, but the people are incapa-
ble of doing so because a previous generation decided otherwise 
over their head. This is the situation which Jefferson, Paine and 
Condorcet had in mind when they demanded flexible constitu-
tions.
To evaluate case 1, it makes sense to draw on the distinction be-
tween autonomy and freedom as is familiar on the level of an 
individual. The Greek etymology of the word “autonomy” means 
“one’s own law”. On the level of a demos, autonomy refers to 
self-governance, i.e. a country’s ability to determine its own affairs 
and to make decisions according to reasonable principles. “Free-
dom”, on the other hand, includes the capacity to override these 
reasoned decisions, by following one’s passions. It seems to me 
that “sovereignty” is, semantically speaking, more closely connect-
ed to “autonomy” than to freedom.68 Thus, in case 1 it is primarily 
a people’s freedom that is restrained by the constitution, not their 
sovereignty/autonomy. This state of affairs, if true, would justify 
paternalistic arguments.69 It is necessary to distinguish the inter- 
from the intragenerational context here. In an intragenerational 
context, a generation can commit itself in a “sober” state to cer-
tain rules. The aim is to prevent itself from actions in a “drunken” 
state that it will regret when “sober” again. The story of Ulysses 
and the Sirens is seen as the archetype of such practice. He has his 
companions tie him to the ship’s mast in order to be able to listen 
to the Sirens without falling for their call. Now, as long as each 
generation decides intragenerationally that it wants to be tied to 
the ship’s mast, there is no intergenerational sovereignty concern. 
But the autonomy of an earlier generation must not turn into het-
eronomy of the latter. Unlike in Ulysses’s case, the constitutional 
hand-cuffs called “eternity clauses” are not self-imposed.70 
Finally case 4: if the citizenship as a whole (as the premises have it) 
is happy with suboptimal constitutional clauses, then their free-
dom is not infringed upon. Nevertheless, they forgo life quality 
as they don’t realise the full potential of their lives and thereby 
one could argue that their sovereignty has not fully materialised. 
Paternalism could be justified. But to impose on a people pater-
nalistically a new, and better, constitution against their will is 
quite hard to do – unless the country collapses after a war. The 
post-World War II constitutions of Germany and Japan might be 
cases in point. 
Tacit consent
Given the severity of the sovereignty concern, one could, prima 
facie, conclude that this blatant intergenerational injustice should 
be corrected as soon as possible. But the defenders of perpetual 
constitutions have a rejoinder that must now be explored in more 
detail: tacit consent.71 John Locke was one of the classical propo-
nents of the idea that individuals articulate decisions as free agents 
entering into consensual relationships with other free agents, and 
that this becomes the basis for political governance. But the no-
tion of tacit consent can also be retrieved from Locke’s writings.72 
According to Locke, both citizens and temporary residents have 
to obey the law but temporary residents, just like passers-by, don’t 
have a voice in passing future legislation.73 Michael Otsuka spec-
Figure 2: Trade­offs between quality and sovereignty
These four cases can be depicted in the following matrix:
Citizens want 
reform
Citizens don’t want 
reform
Constitution 
fosters welfare
1) “disimprove­ 
ment” situation;
possible trade­off
2) reasonableness of 
present citizenry; no 
trade­off
Constitution 
impairs wel-
fare
3) reasonableness 
of present citizen­
ry; no trade­off
4) unsuspecting im­
maturity situation; 
trade­off
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ifies the Lockean argument for tacit consent by adding that tacit 
consent can be presumed only when an individual has a realistic 
opportunity to exit the political society in which he is currently 
residing.74 
Tacit consent seems to provide a splendid justification for leaving 
constitutions unchanged for very long periods of time. However, 
tacit consent as an argument might not reach all that far.
There are always some dissenters in a pluralistic society who want 
to change this or that constitutional provision. In practice, there 
is no such thing as tacit consent by all the people ruled by a con-
stitution or, more precisely: all constitutional clauses. One must 
thus think of tacit consent as a gradual concept. Leaving aside 
those who flee the country, those who express open dissent with 
some constitutional provisions should be subtracted from the 
group of tacit consenters. It is thereby important to understand 
that the failure of success of the open dissenters is not a criterion of 
the legitimacy of certain constitutional provisions. Let’s imagine 
a constitution to be changeable by direct rule of the people, that 
is: referenda without parliamentarian intervention, by a superma-
jority of 75%. Assume arguendo that a lot of citizens are unhappy 
with one clause in the constitution, the right to bear arms in pub-
lic. Let’s assume the dissent varied in the past fifty years, ranging 
from 51% to 74%. The dissenters were unsuccessful in abolishing 
this clause; but it would be false to say that the clause enjoyed “the 
tacit consent of the people”. 
The provisions that specify amendment procedures are arguably 
the most important part of constitutions. These rules are the 
rule-changing rules whereas other provisions “only” establish 
the rules of the political game, which, in turn, determine pub-
lic policy decisions and outcomes.75 It has been shown that the 
degree of rigidity of a constitution negatively correlates with the 
number of times a constitution is changed/amended.76 For in-
stance, article 5 of the US Constitution provides two methods for 
constitution-amending.77 The first method authorises Congress 
to propose constitutional amendments “whenever two-thirds of 
both houses shall deem it necessary”. The second method requires 
Congress, “on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of 
the several states” (currently 34), to “call a convention for pro-
posing amendments”. In the 20th century, concerted efforts were 
undertaken by proponents of particular issues to secure the num-
ber of applications necessary to summon an Article V Convention 
– yet to no avail. One of the legal scholars who demand a new 
Constitutional Convention (second to the Philadelphia Conven-
tion 1787) is Sanford Levinson. In his book Our Undemocratic 
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We 
the People Can Correct It) he argues that many of the US Con-
stitution’s provisions promote either unjust or ineffective govern-
ment.78 Among the provisions he criticises most is the current 
process for electing the US president commonly known as the 
Electoral College. The 2016 presidential election again pointed at 
the problems of this institution. It allowed Donald Trump to be-
come president without the support of the plurality of the voters, 
as Hillary Clinton had received 48.2% of the vote, Donald Trump 
46.1% and others 5.7%. Clinton received 2,864,974 votes more 
than Trump, which is a substantial margin. The Electoral College 
currently employed in the USA is seen by many as an outdated 
institution that should be reformed (or abolished). It would be a 
stark mistake to conclude from its endurance that there is tacit 
consent for this institution. But not only the Electoral College is 
under the critical spotlight: 11,699 measures have been proposed 
to amend the Constitution since 1789 (counted up to 3 January 
2017).79 Individual members of the House and Senate typically 
propose around 190 amendments during each two-year term of 
Congress. Thirty-three amendments have been proposed by the 
United States Congress and sent to the states for ratification since 
the Constitution was put into operation on 4 March 1789. Twen-
ty-seven of these, having been ratified by the requisite number 
of states, became part of the Constitution.80 Of the six proposals 
adopted by Congress and sent to the states that have not been 
ratified by the required number of states, four are still technically 
open and pending, one is closed and has failed by its own terms, 
and one is closed and has failed by the terms of the resolution 
proposing it. In comparison, the Norwegian Constitution, the 
second oldest in the world, has been changed 200 times since it 
came into existence in 1814.
It is misleading to say that constitutions around the world enjoy 
(or have ever enjoyed in the past) tacit consent by all voters. But 
to aver that constitutions generally do not enjoy the support of 
the citizenship would also be inaccurate. What is correct is that 
there is constant call for reform which sometimes becomes louder, 
sometimes less loud, but never ceases. And even if the government 
tries to silence it, as is often the case in authoritarian regimes, it 
is still there. The desire of a part of a nation’s citizenry to modi-
fy their constitution as they learn about unintended, unexpected 
and unwanted consequences is ubiquitous in a globalised and in-
terconnected world. 
Different levels of consent/dissent in different age groups
The intergenerational challenge to the legitimacy of a constitution 
is alleviated if the level of consent is higher within the young gen-
eration than it is within the older one (with the young being the 
first generation in a sequence of succeeding generations). Con-
sequently, the intergenerational challenge is aggravated if there 
is a significantly higher level of dissent among the younger part 
of the demos compared to the older part. The “Brexit” is a telling 
example of a situation in which young voters were outnumbered 
and dominated by the old. Some 75% of voters aged between 18 
and 24 voted against Brexit, and thereby chose to speak out in 
favour of the United Kingdom remaining in the EU.81 On aver-
age, those who voted Leave had 16 years left to live at the time of 
the decision (2016), while those who opted for Remain had a life 
expectancy of another 69 years.
The older voters made a decision the consequences of which will 
not affect them for very long. Even if the legality of the vote is out 
of question, this has the flavour of intergenerational domination.
Conclusion and outlook
I hope that this essay has convincingly made the following points: 
that flexibility and inclusiveness keep an old constitution young; 
that eternity clauses protecting the state’s governmental structure 
are incompatible with the principle of intergenerational justice; 
that constitutions which do not provide windows of opportuni-
ty for amendments for succeeding generations stand in contra-
diction to popular sovereignty, and are thus not legitimate; and 
There are always some dissenters in a pluralistic society 
who want to change this or that constitutional provision.
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that recurrent reform commissions strike a good balance between 
the necessary rigidity and flexibility of constitutions. If all this is 
granted, the route for further research lies ahead. Given the great 
variety of legal and political traditions in constitutionalised states 
around the world, democracies and non-democracies, it seems 
appropriate to conceive differently of such a reform commission 
for each country. There cannot be a “one-size-fits-all” approach.82 
It would be presumptuous to propose the same design for recur-
rent constitutional reform commissions for countries as different 
as, say, Iran and Germany. Further research should look at the 
national level and try to answer the following questions for each 
country: In which time spans should the constitutional reform com­
mission be convened?83 As mentioned, there can be a mathematical 
calculation for this, using the demographic structure of a country. 
But if this is deemed too complicated, a people could just agree 
on an accommodating number, for instance 25 years.84 How long 
should the commission be in session, once it has been convened? Argu-
ably, it should not sit for more than two or three years. By which 
mode should the members of the commission be selected or elected? 
How many members should the commission have altogether?85 Here, 
due to very different national traditions, the opinions might vary 
the most. Path dependencies might limit the range of feasible 
solutions. One option might be an intensive deliberation process, 
bringing members of civil society to the forefront of the process.86 
In fact, there were some intriguing examples for that approach 
in Iceland and in British Columbia.87 But expert commissions 
could also have their merits. After German Reunification, the 
Joint Constitutional Commission that was composed solely by 
members of parliament completed the amendment process suc-
cessfully.88 Provided the commission makes a proposal for a more or 
less extensive revision of the constitution, how should it be ratified? 
Should the usual amendment procedure suffice?89
Providing answers to these kinds of questions90 is very much a 
national project – it could even be “the constitutional project” of 
the current generation of citizens in each country in which the 
institution of a constitutional reform commission has yet to be 
established. It is, after all, “their” constitution.
Notes
1 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.
2 Both “constitution” and “constitutionalism” are contested con-
cepts. For an extended discussion, see e.g. Lutz 2006: 1-25. Grey 
opens his essay with: “Constitutionalism is one of those concepts, 
evocative and persuasive in its connotations yet cloudy in its an-
alytic and descriptive content, which at once enrich and confuse 
political discourse.” (Grey 1979: 189-209).
3 This raises interesting questions with regard to states which do not 
have written constitutions, such as the United Kingdom or Israel. 
In these countries, constitutional provisions can, in principle, be 
changed by ordinary acts of the legislature. 
4 A short note on the method of thought experiments: Thought 
experiments play a crucial role in all philosophical subdisciplines, 
including political philosophy/political theory. While extremely 
counterfactual thought experiments can indeed be a thought-pro-
voking method in philosophy, one must be aware that one can 
seldom derive recommendations for real-world politicians and 
law-makers from premises that are too outlandish. We usually 
want decision-makers to make “all-things-considered-decisions” 
– and rightly so. Thus, thought experiments have a place in po-
litical theory but they should have the right level of “counter-
factuality” in order to be illuminating for the question at hand. 
The point of thought experiments is to render only the relevant 
features of the moral dilemma under discussion salient, so that 
the precise real-world issue at hand can easily be comprehended 
and our  intuitions on the real-world matter isolated. If political 
theorists design thought experiments that are counterfactual in a 
misleading way, these thought experiments fail to do what they 
are supposed to do. Good thought experiments apply just about 
the right level of counterfactuality, and they are extremely cog-
nisant of details.
5 Two different meanings of the word “generation” can be distin-
guished: generations as age groups and generations as ensembles of 
all people living together at a given point in time. The former can 
be termed temporal and the latter intertemporal generations (see 
Tremmel 2009: ch. 2). Thus two kinds of intergenerational justice 
must be distinguished as well: “justice between young, middle-aged 
and old people alive today (temporal intergenerational justice)” 
and “justice between the present generation (all people alive today) 
and future generations (intertemporal intergenerational justice)”. 
Constitutions that are perpetual or very difficult to change pres-
ent a problem for both kinds of intergenerational justice. Howev-
er, unless stated otherwise, in this paper the temporal meaning of 
generation applies. The primary problem is thus justice between 
young, middle-aged and old people in constitution-amending; the 
secondary problem is to do justice to present and future people in 
constitution-amending.
6 More precisely, those who were of voting age at the time the con-
stitution was adopted bind those who were not of voting age then 
because they were too young, or not even born, at that point in 
time. Both groups – those too young to vote and those not yet 
born – can be combined in the term “succeeding generations” (or 
“successor generations”). 
7 Otsuka describes the problem of intergenerational sovereignty 
like this: “[H]ow can one defend the claim that laws enacted by 
a deceased generation of citizens of country x have any authority 
over the present generation of citizens of country x?” (Otsuka 2003: 
136).
8 A contemporary account that is oblivious of this empirical fact 
and sees a demos – in the tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau or 
Carl Schmitt – as a homogenous entity is Muñiz-Fraticelli’s (2009). 
He theorises in the ontological part of his article: “As sovereignty is 
more than the mere exercise of force, it must be the case that there 
exists a norm that recognizes legitimate authority in the sovereign. 
Sovereignty presupposes such a norm; otherwise it is merely the 
exercise of power without justification. Now, popular sovereignty 
is the sovereignty of ‘the people’; it is not the imposition of the will 
of the majority of individuals in a certain territory, but the exercise 
of sovereignty by the people as a whole, as a collective entity. There-
fore, for popular government to be intelligible there must exist a 
norm that grants legitimate authority to this collective agent. While 
it is true that the norm must have an origin, the sovereign people 
itself cannot be the source of it; before the norm there is no ‘people’, 
but only an individual or group of individuals exercising arbitrary 
power. In conferring legitimacy to ‘the people’, the legitimating 
norm and the democratic sovereign come into being at once.” (pp. 
401/402).
9 Muñiz-Fraticelli 2009, 377.
10 Muñiz-Fraticelli 2009, 390, fn. 26.
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11 Jefferson begins his letter with the words: “The question Wheth-
er one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never 
to have been started either on this or our side of the water.” (Jeffer-
son 1789). However, the problem of self-determination was already 
discussed in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, albeit from 
a different angle. Locke wrote: “[W]hatever engagements or prom-
ises any one made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, 
but cannot bind the children or posterity. For his son, when a man, 
being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no 
more give away the liberty of the son than it can of anybody else.” 
(Locke 1690: 156).
12 Jefferson 1789.
13 Jefferson 1789.
14 It was not really a “retort” but in fact a reply that counsels a 
more flexible position. See for the same exegesis Auerbach/Reinhart 
2012: 19. One might also point to the factual behaviour of Jeffer-
son and Madison: their historic actions diverged considerably from 
their rhetoric (see Elkins/Ginsburg/Melton 2009: 12-35).
15 In one theoretical remark, Madison raises the “lost generation” 
objection (see e.g. Shai 2016). In short, this is the complaint that 
those adolescents lucky enough to become enfranchised immedi-
ately before the end of Jefferson’s 19-years-long electoral cycle have 
almost 19 more years of political participation than those who 
come of age immediately after the next electoral cycle has begun. 
The “lost generation” objection must be put in perspective: What 
is preferable: to have one lost generation, or to have many lost gen-
erations? Secondly, the similar problem, albeit on a smaller scale, 
arises by a system of elections every four or five years, as it is com-
monplace. And thirdly, the “disenfranchised youth objection” (as 
it should be called more precisely) is somewhat overstated because 
babies, little children and younger adolescents have no interest in 
political participation anyway. For those minors who do wish to 
participate, a remedy would be a flexible voting age as proposed by 
Tremmel and Wilhelm (2015). 
16 Madison 1790.
17 Madison 1790. In the intense debate at the end of the 18th cen-
tury, Thomas Paine sided with Jefferson and coined the following 
well-known phrase: “The vanity and presumption of governing be-
yond the grave, is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies.” 
(Paine 1998: 91) The right of a people to reform their constitution 
was a key element in the Girondin constitutional project. Article 28 
of the draft of the French Constitution of 1793 stated: “A people 
always has the right to review, reform, and amend its constitution. 
One generation may not subject future generations to its laws.” But 
this constitution was invalidated during the so-called “Reign of 
Terror” in the French Revolution. In the Thermidorian Reaction, 
it was discarded in favour of a more conservative document, the 
Constitution of 1795. 
18 From the correct statement that we should not “[conceive] of 
democracy as an exclusively presentist enterprise” (Rubenfeld 2001: 
12), one cannot derive that prescriptions from unamendable con-
stitutions should outweigh the will of the present citizenry.
19 Roznai 2015: 3.
20 Although Roznai (2015: 4) acknowledges that provisions that 
prohibit amending certain subjects are most commonly referred to 
in the literature as “eternal” provisions, he prefers the term “una-
mendable” provisions for them. I do not follow him here because 
of the difference between a change and an amendment of a consti-
tution. An “amendment” in the Anglo-Saxon tradition is subsidi-
ary to the original text. Amendments can nullify provisions in the 
original text, but they do not change the text; they merely add to it. 
In the US constitution, even amendments such as the 18th (prohi-
bition), which are repealed (by the 21st), remain in the text. In con-
trast, in those parts of the world where constitutions are “changed” 
and not “amended”, the original text is reworked to incorporate the 
intended change of its content. Even if I myself sometimes use, for 
convenience, “amendment” as the umbrella term for both amend-
ments of a constitution and changes of a constitution, I see merit in 
using an unambiguous term such as “eternity provision” here.
21 Roznai 2015: 8. These numbers include those multiple consti-
tutions of the same state.
22 Often, such human rights entrenchments in national consti-
tutions are attempts to break from a past characterised by human 
right violations, as in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Re-
public of Congo.
23 Especially in some of the Arab countries; see for instance Bah-
rain Const. (1973), art. 120(c); Jordan Const. (1952), art. 126(2); 
Libya Const. (1951), art. 197; Qatar Const. (2004), art. 145; 
Kuwait Const. (1962), part V, art. 175; Morocco Consts. (1970, 
1972, 1992), arts. 100, 106, 100, respectively. Roznai (2015: 15) 
draws the conclusion: “Unamendable provisions can not only lim-
it governmental power, but also empower it. When unamendable 
provisions protect the rights of a monarch, the principle of inherit-
ed rules, and succession to the throne, they serve as a mechanism to 
preserve the existing power of the rulers rather than limit it.”
24 Roznai 2015: 11.
25 Roznai (2015: 21): “The unamendability of this provision was 
the result of a compromise because South Carolina and Georgia 
would not consent to an immediate prohibition of slave trafficking. 
Insisting on ending slavery at the constitutional convention might 
have resulted in the collapse of the entire constitutional enterprise.”
26 Article 79 (3)
Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Feder-
ation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative 
process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be 
inadmissible.
27 Article 20
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social 
federal state.
(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exer-
cised by the people through elections and other votes and through 
specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the 
executive and the judiciary by law and justice.
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking 
to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.
28 Article 1
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inal-
ienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and 
of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the execu-
tive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.
29 This is, for example, the situation with regard to the Bulgarian 
Const. (1991), art. 57; the German Basic Law (1949), art. 79; the 
Romanian Const. (1991), art. 14.
30 See, for example, Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina Const. (1995), art. X2; Honduras Const. (1982), 
art. 374; Niger Const. (2010), Art. 177; Rwanda Const. (2003), 
art. 193.
31 Elkins/Ginsburg/Melton 2009: 3.
32 See the section below on the notion of “tacit consent”.
33 The way a constitutional provision can be “challenged” in nor-
mal times (outside the window of opportunity of a reform commis-
sion) varies from state to state. In many countries, a certain number 
of MPs can trigger the procedure of constitution-amending. In 
some countries such as Switzerland, it can be triggered by popu-
lar initiative. If a sufficient number of registered voters push for a 
change, the parliament must debate the proposition. 
34 If migration is factored in, the variable “naturalised immigrants 
(above the voting age) in the years x+1, x+2, ..., x+n” adds to the 
part of the population who are citizens of a country without having 
had the chance to consent to the constitution. But one can argue 
that by applying for naturalisation, these people have consented to 
the constitution of their new home country. I am very grateful both 
to Jürgen Dorbritz (Scientific Director of the Federal Institute for 
Population Research of Germany) and to Markus Rutsche (Univer-
sity of St. Gallen) for thoughtful discussions about this question. 
35 Condorcet proposed a national assembly, convened by the legis-
lative body, to deliberate possible modifications of the constitution 
(Condorcet 1793). He did not plead for sunset constitutions.
36 Their dataset from the Comparative Constitutions Project 
(CCP) covered the constitutional history of every independent state 
from 1789 to 2005, altogether 935 constitutions for more than 200 
different states – the complete universe of cases, not just a sample.
37 Elkins/Ginsburg/Melton 2009: 76. 
38 Muñiz-Fraticelli (2009: 402): “Overwhelmingly, future genera-
tions are the beneficiaries, not the victims, of a constitution enacted 
by their predecessors.”
39 Historically, the first guarantors of human rights were states 
(guaranteeing rights for their respective citizens), but international 
treaties today play an equal, if not more important role in protect-
ing human rights.
40 Rasch/Congleton 2006: 340.
41 According to the Democracy Index 11.4% of all countries are 
“full democracies” and another 34.1% are “flawed democracies”, 
see Economist Intelligence Unit 2016. Of course, “democracy” is a 
highly contested concept. For a different definition of the term, and 
thus a different count, see Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.
42 Ginsburg/Simpser 2014. See also Svolik 2012.
43 Iran, Algeria and Afghanistan use irrevocable provisions to pre-
vent Islam from ever being disestablished. 
44 Article 177 (Revision of the Constitution) states: “The contents 
of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic charac-
ter of the political system; the basis of all the rules and regulations 
according to Islamic criteria; the religious footing; the objectives 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the democratic character of the 
government; the wilayat al-’mr the Imamate of Ummah; and the 
administration of the affairs of the country based on national refer-
enda, official religion of Iran [Islam] and the school [Twelver Ja’fari] 
are unalterable.”
45 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”
46 I owe this point to Bruce Auerbach.
47 The Second Amendment is a case in point against the hope that 
the doctrine of a “living constitution” as proclaimed by scholars 
like David Strauss (2010) will soon materialise in the USA. The 
US Supreme Court has not taken into account changing values 
and circumstances when interpreting key constitutional phrases. In 
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), the Supreme Court handed 
down a landmark decision holding that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to possess and carry firearms. In Mc-
Donald v. Chicago (2010), the Court clarified its earlier decisions 
that limited the amendment’s impact to a restriction on the feder-
al government. In Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016), the Supreme 
Court reiterated its earlier rulings that the Second Amendment ex-
tends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, 
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding, 
and that its protection is not limited to only those weapons useful 
in warfare.
48 In 1789, the enacting of the US Constitution was a great leap 
within the history of political thought, and maybe for the well-
being of mankind as a whole. But nowadays the inability of this 
constitution to be developed further is a problem, perhaps again 
for mankind as a whole, since the USA is needed as a global leader 
on mankind’s hopeful path to a world without of weapons of mass 
destruction and in balance with global environmental boundaries.
49 Madison elaborated on this point in the Federalist Papers, No. 
49. We should “recollect,” he says, “that all the existing constitu-
tions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the 
passions most unfriendly to order and concord.”
50 Roznai 2015: 22.
51 Roznai 2015: 22. See also Holmes 1993: 19.
52 Muñiz-Fraticelli 2009: 388.
53 Elkins/Ginsburg/Melton 2009: 76.
54 I owe this point to Markus Rutsche.
55 Paternalism with regard to children is a different issue that is not 
discussed here.
56 This relates to decisions such as “federalist v. unitary” or “pres-
idential v. parliamentary”. Rules of government must be distin-
guished from basic rights and liberties here. The question whether 
or not basic human rights should be understood as moral truths, 
and therefore be entrenched in national constitutions, would justify 
an article of its own.
57 For details, see Tremmel 2006: 192–197; Brandl/Bungert 1992; 
May/Daly 2014; Cho/Pederson 2013; Ekeli 2007; González-Ricoy 
2016b; MacKenzie 2016; Hayward 2005. 
58 Clauses that are designed only for the purpose of protecting 
future generations and their respective interests are termed “inter-
generational constitutional provisions” by González-Ricoy (2016a) 
and “posterity provisions” by Ekeli (2007). But I think these two 
terms are ambiguous, since basically all clauses of a constitution 
reach into the future and are thus in a certain way “intergeneration-
al” or “related to posterity. Therefore, I deem “posterity protection 
provisions” a clearer term for this very special kind of clauses.
59 Tremmel 2009: 57; Tremmel 2006: 190.
60 “Everyone has the right a) to an environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being;
and b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of pres-
ent and future generations, through reasonable legislature and 
other measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation 
promote conservation; and secure ecologically sustainable devel-
opment and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.”
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61 Constitution of Poland (1997), art. 216 IV.
62 González-Ricoy 2016a: 42.
63 Cho/Pedersen 2013: 435. Some dates for the insertion of such 
provisions: Estonia 1992 (preamble); Czech Republic 1992 (pre-
amble and art. 7); Poland 1997 (preamble and art. 74); Switzerland 
(preamble and art. 73) 1999/2002; Ukraine 1996 (preamble); Ar-
gentina 1994 (art. 41); Brazil 1988 (art. 225); Finland 1999 (art. 
20); Germany 1994 (art. 20a); France 2004 (Charter for the en-
vironment); Hungary 1989 (art. 15); Netherlands 1987 (art. 21); 
Latvia 1998 (art. 115); Lithuania 1992 (art. 54); Portugal 1976 
(art. 66); Slovakia 1992 (art. 44); Slovenia 1991 (art. 72); South 
Africa 1994 (art. 24); Spain 1978 (art. 45); Sweden 1976 (art. 1); 
Uruguay 2004 (art. 47); Bolivia 2002 (art. 7); Norway 1992 (L 110 
b) etc. There are PPPs that were inserted in constitutions directly 
after World War II, such as article 11 of the Japanese Constitution 
of 1946, but one hardly finds any PPPs in older constitutions.
64 For instance, see Singer 2011; Pinker 2011. Jefferson himself 
expressed his belief in the progress of the human mind in a letter 
to Samuel Kercheval from 12 July 1816: “I am certainly not an 
advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitu-
tions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; 
because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, 
and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know 
also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the pro­
gress of the human mind [my emphasis]. As that becomes more de-
veloped, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with 
the times.” (Jefferson 1816)
65 Gosseries 2016: 101.
66 Both definitions, Gosseries’ longer and my shorter one, are 
congruent in asserting that “generational sovereignty” has different 
connotations and implications than “state sovereignty” (a concept 
that is not discussed any further here).
67 To put some flesh to this hypothetical, one might imagine that 
this constitution contains several irrevocable clauses.
68 Note that definitions of “autonomy” and “freedom” are mani-
fold. See e.g. Schneewind 1988; Raz 1988.
69 Apart from the model, the assumption that the framers of a 
constitution know better what is good for a generation living far 
in their future than that very generation itself is so unrealistic that 
paternalism, so conceived, has to be rejected.
70 Elster (2000) uses Ulysses’s case to lay out a fully articulated 
constraint theory. See also Chatziathanasiou 2017, this issue.
71 For a comprehensive account of different kinds of consent, see 
Simmons 1979: 75-100.
72 “There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit con-
sent, which will concern our present case. Nobody doubts but an 
express consent of any man, entering into any society, makes him a 
perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The 
difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and 
how far it binds—i.e., how far any one shall be looked on to have 
consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has 
made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man 
that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions 
of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far 
forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during 
such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether this his possession be 
of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or 
whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, 
it reaches as far as very being of any one within the territories of that 
government.” (Locke 1690: 157 and §§ 117-122 generally). 
73 Cf. Muñiz-Fraticelli 2009, fn. 14.
74 Otsuka 2003: 95-105.
75 Rasch/Congleton 2006.
76 See Lutz 1994. Lutz’s findings are cogently discussed by Rasch/
Congleton (2006).
77 Art. 5 of the US Const. reads: “The Congress, whenever two-
thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amend-
ments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all 
Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by 
the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided that no 
Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand 
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and 
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in 
the Senate.”
78 Levinson (2006: 6): “I believe that it is increasingly difficult to 
construct a theory of democratic constitutionalism, applying our 
own twentyfirst-century norms, that vindicates the Constitution 
under which we are governed today.” And on p. 12: “My task is 
to persuade you that the Constitution we currently live under is 
grievously flawed, even in some ways a clear and present danger to 
achieving the laudable and inspiring goals to which this country 
professes to be committed, including republican self-government.” 
On his legal account of the Second Amendment, see also Levinson 
1989.
79 https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/three_column_ 
table/measures_proposed_to_amend_constitution.htm.
80 The first ten amendments were adopted and ratified simultane-
ously and are known collectively as the Bill of Rights. Counting the 
Bill of Rights as one change, the US Constitution has experienced 
only 18 changes in 230 years. Guess how long it took to ratify the 
27th Amendment of the US Constitution? 202 years, 7 months, 10 
days.
81 http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-king-
dom-voted-and-why.
82 By analogy, this is also true for a related reform proposal for 
constitution-makers: the representation of future generations by a 
future branch of government (see Tremmel 2015).
83 So far, there are only very few examples for constitutions that 
are automatically reviewed clause by clause in fixed intervals (type 
A constitutions), see Elkins/Ginsburg/Melton 2009: 13-14. With 
regard to type B constitutions: 14 American states within the USA 
require the people to be regularly consulted by the legislature about 
whether to call a constitutional reform commission. Article XIX 
of the New York Constitution, for example, provides that the state 
electorate be given the opportunity every 20 years to vote on the 
following question: “Shall there be a convention to revise the con-
stitution and amend the same?”
84 In the historic blueprint for regular reform commissions, the Gi-
rondin Constitutional Project, Condorcet and his co-authors were 
not unambiguous about the time span either, mentioning both 
twenty and ten years as options, see Condorcet 1793, 244.
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85 The composition of the commissions is rather an intragenera-
tional than an intergenerational topic.
86 González-Ricoy (2016a) lists some criteria for civil society re-
form commissions, among them: a) The amendment is drafted by 
a convention called for that purpose and constituted by members 
of civil society (rather than by members of parliament, who may 
have electoral or partisan motivations); b) To ensure diversity and 
inclusiveness, members of the convention are appointed by lot. To 
improve descriptive representativeness, some seats are reserved for 
members of minorities. Members of the convention receive ongo-
ing technical and legal advice.
87 Landemore 2015; Warren/Pearse 2008.
88 This was a commission that was brought about by special his-
toric circumstances, as the German Basic Law does not yet speak of 
constitutional commissions.
89 Formal amendment rules for “spontaneous” amendments (inde-
pendent from the proposed reform commission) vary significantly. 
Supermajorities in parliament, referenda and intervening elections 
(confirmation by a double vote) are the most common ones. For 
classification schemes, see Rasch/Congleton 2006: 328-330; Elster 
2000: 101; Lane 1996: 144. 
90 For related questions with regard to constitution-making assem-
blies, see Elster 2012: 16.
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